Worm Epidemics in Wireless Adhoc Networks by Nekovee, Maziar
ar
X
iv
:0
70
7.
22
93
v1
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 16
 Ju
l 2
00
7
Worm Epidemics in Wireless Adhoc Networks
Maziar Nekovee
BT Research, Polaris 134, Adastral Park,
Martlesham, Suffolk IP5 3RE, UK
and
Centre for Computational Science,
University College London,
20 Gordon Street, London WC1H 0AJ, UK
A dramatic increase in the number of computing devices with wireless communication capability
has resulted in the emergence of a new class of computer worms which specifically target such devices.
The most striking feature of these worms is that they do not require Internet connectivity for their
propagation but can spread directly from device to device using a short-range radio communication
technology, such as WiFi or Bluetooth. In this paper we develop a new model for epidemic spreading
of these worms and investigate their spreading in wireless adhoc networks via extensive Monte Carlo
simulations. Our studies show that the threshold behaviour and dynamics of worm epidemics in
these networks are greatly affected by a combination of spatial and temporal correlations which
characterise these networks, and are significantly different from the previously studied epidemics in
the Internet.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc,05.70.Jk,87.19.Xx, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Worms are self-replicating computer viruses which can
propagate through computer networks without any hu-
man intervention [1, 2, 3]. Cyber attacks by this type
of viruses present one of the most dangerous threats to
the security and integrity of computer and telecommu-
nications networks. The Code Red [4, 5] and Nimda [4]
worms, for example, infected hundreds of thousands of
computers at alarming speeds and the resulting worm
epidemics cost both the public and the private sector a
great deal of money. The last few years have seen the
emergence of a new type of worms which specifically tar-
gets portable computing devices, such as smartphones
and laptops. The novel feature of these worms is that
they do not necessarily require Internet connectivity for
their propagation. They can spread directly from de-
vice to device using a short-range wireless communication
technology, such as WiFi or Bluetooth [4, 6, 7, 8], creat-
ing in their wake an adhoc contact network along which
they propagate. The first computer worm written spe-
cially for wireless devices was detected in 2003 and within
three years the number of such viruses soared from one
to more than 300 [8]. With wireless networks becoming
increasingly popular, many security experts predict that
these networks will soon be a main target of attacks by
worms and other type of malware. [8].
Worm and virus attacks on the Internet have been the
subject of extensive empirical, theoretical and simula-
tion studies [1, 9, 10, 11, 12]. These studies have greatly
contributed to our understanding of the impact of net-
work topology on the properties of virus spreading [9, 10]
and have inspired the design of more effective immunisa-
tion strategies to prevent and combat Internet epidemics
[11, 12]. Investigation of virus spreading in wireless net-
works in general and worms in particular is, however, at
its infancy, and there has been very limited studies which
address this problem [7, 13].
In this paper we develop a new model for the spreading
of worms in Wi-Fi-based wireless adhoc networks and in-
vestigate the properties of worm epidemics in these net-
works via extensive Monte Carlo simulations. Wireless
adhoc networks [14, 15, 16, 16, 17, 18] are distributed net-
works which can be formed on the fly by WiFi-equipped
devices, such as laptops and smartphones. Nodes in these
networks communicate directly with each other and can
route data packets wirelessly, either among themselves
or to the nearest Internet accesspoint. Adhoc technology
has important applications in the provisioning of ubiq-
uitous wireless Internet access, disaster relief operations
and wireless sensor networks. From the perspective of
complex network theory [20, 21, 22, 23] the study of
these networks is important as their topology provides
a clear-cut example of spatial networks [24]. Spatial net-
works are embedded in a metric space where interactions
between the nodes is a function of their spatial distance
[24, 25]. Despite their relevance to many real-life phe-
nomena the properties of these networks are much less
studied than abstract graphs.
Our Monte Carlo simulations show that epidemic
spreading in wireless adhoc networks is significantly dif-
ferent from the previously studied epidemics in the In-
ternet. The initial growth of the epidemic is significantly
slower than the exponential growth observed for worm
spreading in the Internet, and the epidemic prevalence
exhibits a density-dependent critical threshold which is
higher than the value predicted by the mean-field theory.
We show that these differences are due to strong spa-
tial and temporal correlations which characterise these
networks. Our study also reveals the presence of a self-
throttling effect in the spreading of worms in wireless
networks which greatly slows down the speed of worm
2invasion in these networks.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section
II we describe our models of network topology, data com-
munication mechanism, and worm spreading in wireless
adhoc networks. In section III we present and discuss re-
sults of our Monte Carlo simulations studies of epidemics
in these networks for a range of device densities and in-
fection rates. We close this paper in section IV with
conclusions.
II. MODELS
A. Network model
We consider a collection of nodes distributed in a two
dimensional plane which communicate using short-range
radio transmissions. The received radio signal strength
at a device j resulting from a transmission by a device i
decays with the distance between the sender and the re-
ceiver due to a combination of free-space attenuation and
fading effects. Phenomenologically this effect is described
using the so-called pathloss model [26] which states that
the mean value of the signal power at a receiving device
j is related to the signal power of the transmitting node
i via the following equation:
P ij =
P i
crαij
. (1)
In the above equation rij is the Euclidean distance be-
tween node i and node j, P i and P ij are the transmit
power and the received power, respectively, and c is a
constant whose precise value depends on a number of
factors including the transmission frequency. For free
space propagation α = 2, but depending on the specific
indoor/outdoor propagation scenario it is found empiri-
cally that α can vary typically between 2 and 5. A data
transmission by node i is correctly received at node j,
i.e. i can establish a communication link with j, pro-
vided that:
P ij
ν
=
P i/crαij
ν
≥ βth. (2)
In the above equation βth is an attenuation threshold and
ν is the noise level at node j.
Condition (2) translates into a maximum transmission
range for node i:
rit =
(
P i
cβthν
)1/α
, (3)
such that each device can establish wireless links with
only those devices within a circle of radius rit. A commu-
nication graph is then constructed by creating an edge
between node i and all other nodes in the plane that are
within the transmission range of i, and repeating this pro-
cedure for all nodes in the network. In general wireless
devices may use different transmit powers such that the
existence of a wireless link from i to j does not imply that
a link from j to i also exists. Consequently the resulting
communication graph is directed. Assuming, however,
that all devices use the same transmit power P , and a
corresponding transmission range rt, the topology of the
resulting network can be described as a two dimensional
random geometric graph (RGG) [27, 28]. Random geo-
metric graphs have been used extensively in the study
of continuum percolation and more recently for mod-
elling wireless adhoc networks [15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Like
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs (RG) [30], these graphs have
a Poisson degree distribution, P (k), which peaks at an
average value 〈k〉 and shows small fluctuations around
〈k〉. However, other properties of a RGG are radically
different from a Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph. Most no-
tably, these networks are characterised by a large cluster
coefficient, C = 0.59, which is a purely geometric quan-
tity independent of both node density and 〈k〉 [15, 28].
Furthermore, it has been shown numerically that the crit-
ical connectivity in these networks is at 〈k〉 = 4.52 [28],
which is much higher than the well-known 〈k〉 = 1 value
in RG.
B. Medium access control
In WiFi networks access to the available frequency
channels is controlled by a coordination mechanism called
the Medium Access Control (MAC) [29]. The function of
the MAC is to ensure interference-free wireless transmis-
sions of data packets in the network. This is achieved by
scheduling in time the transmissions of nearby devices in
such a way that devices whose radio transmissions may
interfere with each other do not get access to the wire-
less channel at the same time. The presence of the MAC
introduces novel spatio-temporal correlations in the dy-
namics of data communications in these networks which
are absent in the Internet communications.
The MAC protocol used by WiFi-based wireless de-
vices follows the IEEE 802.11 standard [29], which spec-
ifies a set of rules that enable nearby devices coordinate
their transmissions in a distributed manner. The IEEE
802.11 MAC is a highly complex protocol and we do not
attempt to fully model this protocol. Instead we focus
on the most relevant aspect of this protocol, the so-called
listen-before-talk (LBT) rule. This rule dictates that
each device should check the occupancy of the wireless
medium before starting a data transmission and refrain
from transmitting if it senses that the medium is busy.
The precise implementation of the LBT algorithm will
be discussed in section II.D.
C. Worm propagation model
Worms are stand-alone computer viruses which use
networks for their spreading among computing devices.
3Consequently, computer worms can propagate automat-
ically from device to device, in contrast to other types
of virus which require some form of user involvement for
their spreading.
Several previous studies have analysed and modelled
the propagation of computer worms on the Internet.
Most contemporary Internet worms work as follows [4].
When a computer worm is fired into the Internet, it scans
the IP (Internet Protocol) addresses and sends a probe
to infect the corresponding machines. When a vulnera-
ble machine becomes infected by such a probe, it begins
running the worm and tries to infect other machines. A
patch, which repairs the security holes of the machine, is
used to defend against worms. When an infected or vul-
nerable machine is patched against a worm, it becomes
immune to that worm. There are several different scan-
ning mechanisms that worms deploy. Two main mecha-
nisms are random scanning and local subnet scanning. In
random scanning an infected computer scans the entire
IP address space and selects its targets randomly from
this space. In local scanning the worm scans the nearby
targets (e.g. machines on the same subnet) with a higher
probability. Many recent worms, such as Code Red v2
have used localised scanning.
The above mechanisms require that both the infected
and the vulnerable nodes are connected to the Internet
and rely on the IP routing mechanism for worm delivery.
However, it is well-known that point-to-point routing of
data packets in wireless adhoc networks could be prob-
lematic due to the highly dynamic nature of these net-
works. A much more robust mechanism for disseminat-
ing packets in such networks is by multihop forwarding in
which a packet propagates in the network by broadcast
radio transmissions from device to device, without the
need for any routing mechanism or Internet connectivity.
This mechanism shows interesting analogies with the way
airborne diseases spread in populations and has been ex-
ploited in a recent worm attack on Bluetooth-enabled
smartphones [8]. We assume therefore that worms tar-
geting these networks will utilise multihop broadcasts as
their primary method of propagation. With respect to
an attacking worm, we assume that nodes in the network
to be in one of the following three states: vulnerable, in-
fected, or immune. Infected nodes try to transmit the
worm to their neighbours at every possible opportunity.
Vulnerable nodes can become infected at a rate λ when
they receive a transmission containing a copy of the worm
from an infected neighbour. Finally, infected nodes get
patched and become immune to the worm at a rate δ.
We denote by S(t), I(t) and R(t) the population of vul-
nerable, infected and immune nodes, respectively.
D. Implementation
In our simulations we have implemented the above
model of worm spreading in wireless adhoc networks in
the following way. At each timestep of simulations we
create a randomly ordered list of the infected nodes in
the network at that timestep. The first node on the list
then gets access to the wireless channel and is allowed
to transmit the worm. All other infected nodes that are
within the transmission range of this node are eliminated
from the list as their transmission may cause interfer-
ence to that node, and is therefore blocked by the LBT
rule. This procedure is repeated for the remaining nodes
until the list is reduced to a set of non-interfering in-
fected nodes which can transmit the worm at that same
timestep.
Subsequently, all infected nodes which are on the above
list go through a broadcast round in which they transmit
the worm to their neighbours. Finally, all infected nodes
(i.e. both those who were able to transmit the worm
and those whose transmissions were blocked by the MAC
protocol) go through a patching round in which they may
become immune with probability δ.
III. SIMULATION STUDIES
We simulated the propagation of worms in wireless ad-
hoc networks comprising N devices spread in a L2 =
1000 × 1000 m2 area. The transmission range of all
devices was set at 50 m, which is somewhere between
the typical minimum (30 m) and maximum (100 m)
range of the WiFi systems. In order to investigate
the impact of device density we performed our simu-
lations for a range of densities, corresponding to N =
4000, 6000, 8000, 10000, 20000.
For a given density, nodes were distributed randomly
and uniformly in the simulation cell. The resulting RGG
networks were constructed following the prescription of
Sec. II. A, and periodic boundary conditions were used
in order to reduce finite-size effects. We verified numer-
ically that all the networks considered were connected,
and their degree distributions were well-described by the
Poisson distribution:
P (k) = e−〈k〉
〈k〉k
k!
, (4)
with the average degree,〈k〉, given by:
〈k〉 = pir2t ρ, (5)
where ρ = N/L2 is the device density.
The spreading dynamics was simulated on top of the
above networks using Monte Carlo simulations. Each
Monte Carlo run starts by infecting a single randomly
chosen node and proceeds following the rules described in
sections II.C and II.D until the epidemic dies out (i.e. no
infected node is left in the network). We typically average
our results over 500 Monte Carlo runs. Furthermore,
the results were also averaged over simulations starting
from at least 5 different initial infected seeds. Since the
time scale of the epidemic spreading depends only on the
ratio λ/δ, rather than λ and δ separately, without the
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FIG. 1: The epidemic prevalence, R∞, is shown as a function
of the infection rate λ for a wireless adhoc network consisting
of N = 10000 nodes, both in the absence and presence of
the MAC mechanism. Also shown is the result for a random
graph network with the same number of nodes and the same
degree distribution as the wireless adhoc network.
loss of generality we set the patching rate at δ = 1 and
performed our simulations for a range of values of the
infection rate, λ.
In order to investigate the impact of the MAC on worm
epidemics all simulations were performed both in the
presence and in the absence of this mechanism. The
latter case corresponds to an idealised scenario where
nearby devices can communicate with each other without
causing harmful interference, for example by using non-
overlapping frequency channels [34], and maps the dy-
namics of worm spreading onto the standard susceptible-
infected-removed (SIR) epidemic model. Finally, as a
point of reference, we also performed simulation studies
of the SIR model on a set of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs
which were constructed such that their degree distribu-
tion virtually coincided with that of our RGG networks.
In the following we shall refer to our full simulations as
RGG+MAC while simulations in the absence of MAC
will be labelled as RGG and those performed on ran-
dom graphs as RG. For future reference we note that
the SIR epidemic on random graphs roughly mimics the
spread of Internet worms via random scanning, and is
well-described by the mean-field theory.
A. Prevalence and epidemic threshold
A key quantity in the study of epidemics in networks
is the epidemic prevalence. For the SIR-type epidemics
this quantity is defined as R∞ = limt→∞R(t)/N [31].
In Fig. 1 prevalence as a function of λ is shown as ob-
tained from our simulations of, respectively, RG, RGG
and RGG+MAC networks comprising N = 10000 nodes.
It can be seen that in all these networks R∞ exhibits a
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FIG. 2: The epidemic prevalence, R∞, as a function of the in-
fection rate λ is shown for wireless adhoc networks comprising
N = 6000, 8000, 10000, 20000 nodes, respectively. Results are
shown for simulations performed in the absence of the MAC
mechanism.
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FIG. 3: Collapse plots of R∞ vs. κ = λ〈k〉 is shown for wire-
less adhoc networks comprising N = 6000, 8000, 10000, 20000
nodes, both in the presence and absence of the MAC mecha-
nism.
critical threshold λc below which a worm cannot spread
in the network and above which it infects a finite frac-
tion of the nodes. However, the epidemic threshold corre-
sponding to RGG is at a considerably higher value than
that of RG, despite the fact that the degree distribu-
tions of these two networks are identical. Furthermore,
it can be seen that the inclusion of the MAC mecha-
nism results in an increase in the value of the epidemic
threshold in RGG, shifting the position of λc even further
away from the RG value. Our computed epidemic thresh-
olds for the above networks are λ = 0.0140, 0.0210, 0.0265
for RG, RGG and RGG+MAC, respectively. The mean-
field theory, which in the infinite system size limit be-
comes exact for the RG network, predicts an epidemic
5threshold at λc = 1/〈k〉 [31, 32] , yielding λc = 0.0127
for the above networks. This is in good agreement with
our Monte Carlo result for the RG network, indicating
that the above differences between λc in RG, RGG and
RGG+MAC are not due to finite-size effects (or statis-
tical fluctuations) but are caused by a combination of
topological and dynamic correlations in our wireless net-
works, which are absent in RG.
Qualitatively, we can understand the above results by
noting that due to spatial ordering in random geomet-
ric graphs, the epidemic state of a node in a RGG is
strongly correlated to the state of its neighbours. These
correlations reduce the so-called reproductive rate of the
epidemic, the average number of new infections that can
be produced by an infective node, below the value pre-
dicted by the mean-field approximation, hence increasing
λc above the mean-field value. The presence of the MAC
introduces additional temporal correlations between the
transmission times of adjacent infective nodes which fur-
ther reduce the reproductive rate, hence further increas-
ing λc above the mean-field value. It can be seen from
Fig.1 that this latter mechanism not only affects λc but
also results in a significant reduction in the epidemic
prevalence.
Next we investigate the impact of node density, ρ, on
the behaviour of epidemic prevalence in our networks.
In Fig. 2 we plot R∞ as function of λ for different de-
vice densities. Results are shown only for RGG but they
show a similar behaviour for RGG+MAC. It can be seen
that for all densities considered the prevalence shows a
critical behaviour. However, the position of λc decreases
monotonically with increasing density, i.e. the worm epi-
demic is more successful in invading the network when
the density of devices is high and less so when density
is low. In order to better understand the density depen-
dent behaviour of R∞ we plot in Fig. 3 this quantity as
function of κ = λ〈k〉 = λpiρr2t . It can be seen that for
RGG there is a good collapse of curves in an extended
region around the threshold. This indicates that in this
region the prevalence of the SIR model on RGG is well-
described by the scaling relation R∞(λ, ρ) = f(κ) (For
RGG+MAC this scaling holds only approximately). In
particular, we find that the epidemic threshold itself can
be written as:
λc =
κc
〈k〉
=
κc
piρr2t
, (6)
with κc = 1.50, a correction to the mean-field model re-
sulting from spatial correlations in RGG. Since the clus-
ter coefficient, C, is a measure of correlations in a net-
work, we note that the value of κ is in fact very close
to 1/C indicating that the departure from the mean-field
model is possibly controlled by this quantity.
Next, we investigate the dependence of the epidemic
prevalence on device density. In Fig. 4 this quantity is
plotted as a function of N and for λ = 0.1, both in the
presence of MAC and when this mechanism is switched
off. It can be seen that in both cases R∞ increases mono-
tonically with increasing node density. Furthermore, for
all values of N the curve corresponding to RGG+MAC
lies below that of RGG. However, the gap between the
two curves decreases as N is increased, indicating that
the impact of MAC on R∞ becomes less significant at
high densities.
B. Spreading dynamics
Finally, we discuss the propagation dynamics of worms
in our networks. Fig. 5 displays, as an example, time
evolution of the total fraction of infected nodes, I(t)/N ,
in the N = 10000 node network and for λ = 0.1. For
comparison we have also plotted the result obtained for
the corresponding random graph network. As can be seen
from Fig. 5 worm spreading on the RGG network takes
place at a much slower pace than on the RG network. In
particular, the initial growth of the epidemic on RGG is
much slower than the exponential growth seen for RG,
which is a hallmark of mean-field models [33] and is also
observed in epidemics in the Internet [2].
The above slow growth of the epidemic on the RGG
is a purely topological effect, which we attribute to a
combination of spatial correlations and high clustering
in this network. As can be seen from Fig. 5 switching
on the MAC protocol in RGG slows down the epidemic
on this network even further. This effect, which we call
self-throttling, is caused by temporal correlations in the
spreading dynamics introduced by the MAC and has also
been observed in a recent study of IP-based worm spread-
ing in mobile adhoc networks [7]. It results because adja-
cent infective devices compete with each other in access-
ing the shared wireless medium, hence effectively block-
ing each other’s broadcasts and slowing down the overall
progress of the epidemic. In Fig. 6 we display our result
for R(t)/N in the N = 10000 networks, which further
demonstrates the great impact of spatial and temporal
correlations on the spreading process in our wireless net-
works.
Next we discuss the impact of device density on the
speed of worm propagation. As an indicator of the speed
we use the position of the peak in I(t)/N , which we call
Tmax. This quantity is plotted in Fig. 7 as a function of
N , both in the absence and presence of MAC. It can be
seen that both curves show a monotonic decrease with in-
creasing node density. Furthermore, we see that the self-
throttling mechanism is most effective in slowing down
the epidemic at the lowest density, where we observe a
∼ 40% increase in Tmax when MAC is switched on. As
density increases the gap between the two curves becomes
initially smaller before settling down at higher densities.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduced a model for the propa-
gation of a new class of computer worms which specifi-
cally target wireless computing devices. Using extensive
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FIG. 4: The epidemic prevalence in a wireless adhoc net-
work is plotted as a function of the number of devices in the
network. Results are shown of simulations performed in the
absence (circles) and presence of the MAC (squares).
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FIG. 5: Time evolution of the fraction of infective devices,
I(t)/N , is shown for networks consisting of N = 10000 nodes.
Results of simulations are shown both in the absence (squares)
and presence (triangles) of MAC. Also shown are the results
for the corresponding random graph network (circles).
Monte Carlo simulations we investigated the epidemic
spreading of such worms in WiFi-based wireless adhoc
networks. We incorporated the spatial topology of these
networks via a random geometric graph model, and also
took into account the impact of the Medium Access Con-
trol on wireless data communications in these networks.
Our studies show that worm epidemics in wireless ad-
hoc networks are greatly different from the previously
studied epidemics in the Internet. The epidemic thresh-
old was found to be density-dependent and for all den-
sities considered significantly higher than the value pre-
dicted by the mean-field theory. Furthermore, the ini-
tial growth of the epidemic was found to be significantly
slower than the exponential growth observed in Internet
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FIG. 6: Time evolution of the fraction of immunised devices,
R(t)/N , is shown for the same networks as in Fig. 5.
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FIG. 7: The position of the epidemic peak, Tmax, in RGG
networks is plotted as function of N . Results are shown when
the MAC is switched off (circles) and when it is switched on
(squares).
epidemics and predicted by the mean-field theory. We
showed that these differences were due to a combination
of spatial and temporal correlations which are inherent to
wireless data networks. Our study also revealed the pres-
ence of a self-throttling mechanism which results from a
competition between adjacent infected devices for access
to the shared wireless medium. This mechanism greatly
reduces the speed of worm propagation and the risk of
large-scale worm epidemics in these networks.
An understanding of the propagation characteristics of
worm attacks on wireless networks is of great importance
for the design of effective detection and prevention strate-
gies for these networks. The work presented in this paper
is a first step in this direction and, we hope, will inspire
future empirical and theoretical investigations. From the
perspective of complex network theory, our work presents
7an extensive study of epidemic spreading in random ge-
ometric graphs, and highlights the important role that
spatial correlations play in dynamic processes on these
and other spatial networks.
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